The Israeli intelligence and security services

24. What is the function of the Inspector General of Police?

The INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE runs the Border Guard. This body guards the cease-fire lines, preventing Arab infiltration. It also has charge of detecting and preventing Fedayeen terrorists. In recent years it has been used to "suppress riots and demonstrations" on the West Bank.

25. What is the function of the Military Intelligence?

The MILITARY INTELLIGENCE is in charge of strategic and tactical intelligence.

It also:

-Furnishes national intelligence estimates;
-Assesses all information about the Arabs;
-Develops and protects communication codes and ciphers for the services, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and for communications intelligence.

26. What is the function of the Research and Political Planning Center?

The RESEARCH AND POLITICAL PLANNING CENTER (formerly the Research Division of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs) scrutinises initial intelligence from various sources for the policymaking level of the state.

27. Are there any other organisations or state departments involved in the supply of intelligence?

Yes, these are:

• The Ministry of Finance (Customs and Excise, Investment and Securities);
• The Ministry of Tourism;
• El Al, the Israeli airline;
• Zim, the Israeli shipping line;
• Also non-governmental Zionist and Jewish communities inside and outside Israel give help when needed.

28. How many personnel are we talking about working for the Va'adat (1977)?

	Intelligence section		Personnel allocation
	Mossad		1,500-2,000 Of these, officers number approximately 500
	Shin Beth		1,000 Of these, officers number approximately 550
	Military Intelligence		7,000 Of these officers number 450, others are enlisted personnel and civilian clerks
	Research and Political Planning Center, Ministry for Foreign Affairs		75-100
	Police		Approximately 12,000
	Border Guards		Approximately 6,000

29. What is the financial allocation for state intelligence?

The funds are "concealed" in the defense budget. The only officers with access to this information are the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, one or two top assistants, the Minister of Finance, the State Comptroller and his Defense Services Inspectorate.

30. Who is the State Comptroller?

The State Comptroller deals with the requests for funding, which are made by the directors of the intelligence services at the beginning of the fiscal year in April. The budget negotiations start with estimates of expenses given by the directors (who all have reputations for honesty and integrity). The Ministry of Finance works on a 10-year projection of expense requirements ("an impossible task which is not taken seriously").

The Comptroller holds meetings with the directors and their staff. He examines their programs in detail. This takes place during the month of May. The result is a "redefinition of the entire intelligence and security effort and its cost". The process of deciding final budgets ends by October, based on the analysis completed the previous May. The final financial allocation is then submitted for higher approval. When approved it is time for the new planning and budgeting cycle to begin again.

The State Comptroller also inspects the administrative support for the services. This is managed by the Ministry for Defense. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) provides and funds specific cover. There is also close cooperation between the civilian intelligence and security services and military intelligence.

An Assistant Director-General annually inspects the bookkeeping, financial management and administration procedures of the defense and security services, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and the police. His objective is to ensure these are operated economically, efficiently and with "irreproachable morality".

31. Do the intelligence services cooperate with one another in addition to that suggested in FAQ.30, and how is any cross-over funded?

Yes. Money, personnel, equipment and materials constantly change hands between the services. The salaries of the personnel are paid by their assigned office. So an intelligence officer from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on loan to the Jewish Agency in New York would have expenses and salary paid by the Agency, but does not lose his rank nor retirement status whilst doing so.

(a) THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE SERVICES

32. Do the government and the intelligence services get on with one another?

The services "enjoy a strong position in the government, and their affairs are well integrated into more general operations". The older government members who were party to the establishment of the state of Israel also "were companions of longstanding and joint veterans of such enterprises as illegal immigration and arms-running". Many of the present leaders of Israel were once members of the military, fighting the Arabs, and came into politics through a relationship to the more important political parties. All of them "had some experience in clandestine matters" and therefore appreciate good intelligence and security.

33. What kind of government support do the services receive?

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs provides particularly good support. "Many senior diplomats are former intelligence officers". They therefore know the business, and "serve as valuable auxiliaries" to intelligence service members who are ensured cover by the Ministry.

34. Do diplomats make good 'spies'?

Israeli diplomats are more than likely to have another language, area knowledge or other specialisation which allows them to broaden their social base and so further their contacts. Diplomats might have been, for example, former citizens of the countries to which they are assigned. The information they gather is available immediately for use in operations or to be put on file. Because of the lively nature of a social diplomat's life and its extension outside the embassy, it is difficult for the countries he resides in to detect the diplomat who is also an intelligence officer.

35. Apart from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs do any other departments give support?

Yes, similarly strong support comes from the Ministry of Defence and the Jewish Agency.

36. Apart from diplomats, are 'spies' drawn from other areas of life?

Government and the private sector are also areas where the Israeli intelligence service have a position. Like the leaders of the Israeli state, civil service and business leaders at some time have either been a part of or have been closely associated with intelligence operations.

37. Do intelligence operatives play a duel role then in government/business as well as in the services?

Those with a background in the Service may well be appointed to government roles. So the operations of the service are backed up by personnel in government or business who understand their needs.

38. Is there a political bias to the services?

The services are supposedly non-political and its members are not allowed to participate in partisan politics.

39. So who decides service involvement in government matters?

The political place for forming sensitive policies and deciding action starts with the Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee of Knesset. The Director of Mossad and the Director of Shin Beth would be invited to meetings where their interests are involved.

(b) THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SERVICES AND THE POPULATION

40. Do the intelligence services and the people of Israel get on with one another?

The present [1977] relationship between the services and the populace is good. They are seen as the defenders of Israel and heading the fight against Arab "terrorists" and their armies and so most of the population support the service's activities. The historical development of the state of Israel together with the "long continuing struggle" against the Arabs makes for little dissent in this matter.

41. What dissent is there against the intelligence service's operations?

Rivalry and disagreements in politics have in the past promoted attacks against the service, with opponents accusing it of giving rise to a police state.

42. Has the service done things which can be defined as attributes of a 'police state'?

On a few occasions, representatives have had to appear in closed court, defending accusations of "kidnapping, brutality and illegality". "Although debates in the Knesset occasionally have reflected probably illegal practices or procedures by the services," the loyalty of the intelligence and security community is such that if they were asked to execute legal or illegal tasks, they would do so.

43. Have there been peaks of popularity for the services?

Significant periods of popularity for the services have been:

1967. The Six-Day War.
The Israeli media heaped praise upon the activities of the Military Intelligence, as well as Shin Beth and the police for helping with the victory and in controlling the Arab areas brought [under occupation];

1973. The Yom Kippur War.
The failure of this war, however, caused popular doubt in the services. But public confidence was partly brought back by the work of the Agranat Commission, which was set up to assess the intelligence community, its disabilities and improve cooperation amongst its various parts.

Further operations by the services against "terrorism" have contributed towards keeping the public loyal:

1976, July. The Entebbe Raid.
This rescue of hijacked Israeli hostages caught the public imagination and was a well-coordinated and well-executed operation. The Israelis were cheered by this success and the intelligence community looked good as a result.

44. What about the internal financial culture of the intelligence services? What is 'protektsia', for example?

(a) INTEGRITY

This has been characterised by highest professional standards of integrity and honesty throughout. There is little difference between salaries regardless of the level of position. But this has led to the granting of privileges to create differentiation: expense accounts, purchasing of tax-free goods, and low-cost housing or privileges through influential government connections, known in Israel as protektsia. "Because the intelligence and security services, especially Shin Beth, maintain a very tight cover within their own community, information on personnel, budgets and accounts" is only known to a few top government people and not subject to normal bureaucratic consideration and control. The higher graded personnel study carefully the expenditure of funds lower down the ranks and any financial dishonesty is severely punished.

45. How is the effectiveness of the service maintained ?

(b) EFFICIENCY

"Israel's intelligence and security services are mong the best in the world. Their expert personnel and sophisticated techniques have made them highly effective, and they have demonstrated outstanding ability to organize,screen and evaluate information obtained from recruited agents, Jewish communities, and other sources throughout the world." Hence their advantage over the Arab world, as in 1967.

Much of this can be attributed to those members who came from the Information Service and older parts of the Haganah, before and after World War II. A core of capable and highly-educated individuals from Europe and the Middle East were recruited. The main body of the 'Old Guard' is multi-lingual, fluent in four to five languages. The younger generation is highly trained, being sent abroad and sometimes "engag[ing] in clandestine operations while pursuing their course of studies".

In the past Israeli signal intelligence successes were enormous, partly due to poor Arab communications security. This reduced the need for good agent operations.

46. Are there any weaknesses in this Israeli intelligence ?

With the improvement of Arab communications security we see, for example, the Yom Kippur War intelligence failure.

The reason for this is possibly that "the production of most finished intelligence and the preparation of national estimates is done by Military Intelligence rather than by an independent service". In the Yom Kippur War it was seen that the armed services were not objective enough in "observing and reporting foreign developments and making national intelligence estimates" as well as bias caused by vested interest in military operations. The Agranat Commission has recommended changes.

47. Isn't it dangerous to be a member of the Israeli intelligence ?

(c) SECURITY

The Tel Aviv headquarters is reported to be excellent. Mossad used to be located in the centre of the city in a general army compound, protected by high wire fences and guards. Military Intelligence still remains there but Mossad now has a wing of a multistory commercial office building across the street. Shin Beth, formerly inhabiting a rundown building in Jaffa, took new quarters north of Tel Aviv in June 1970. This purpose-built building, controlled by guards, is fenced in and contains a technical laboratory plus its offices. Employees within the compound wear badges bearing a photograph. (Israeli citizens themselves are subjected to stringent registration requirements and must carry identification papers.)

Identity of intelligence personnel are not revealed to even other government employees. Compartmentalisation is maintained between the intelligence services with only designated 'hard-core' individuals crossing lines. Intelligence and security personnel widely use pseudonyms and change names. (In addition, Hebraicizing European or Yiddish birth names also makes identification difficult.)

• Certain unlisted and personal telephone numbers are known only to relatively few people. This at home professional demeanour is excellent training for when going onto foreign assignments.
• Classified information may not be discussed over the telephone.
• "Installations and storage containers must conform to rigorous security standards.
• Classification terms Top Secret, Secret, Confidential and Restricted (comparable to For Official Use Only) are used.
• Secret documents are transmitted by courier only in double envelopes and two receipts are required—one for the package and one for the contents." These are logged in and out by date, document number, title or subject, and the office accepting responsibility for them.
• At least three periodic inventories are held each year. A registry produces a computer printout four times a year listing all Top Secret material for which each unit is responsible.
• Electrical communication is handled entirely by teleprinter and other communication security devices.
• A record is made of documents to be destroyed and security officers must witness the destruction of all Top Secret and Secret material."

48. What about their visitors ?

There is a highly protected 'guest house' for the training and accommodation of visiting foreign intelligence, foreign dignitaries and sensitive agents.

"Visiting foreign officials and agents never use the same car twice when meeting clandestinely with Israeli officers within the country."

49. How can they be so sure that intelligence staff are loyal ?

All of the 1,000 plus staff officers working for Mossad and Shin Beth have been given a long, thorough security check. Any doubt in an applicant results in their application being rejected.

Left-wingers are generally now not trusted. Internal security systems to reveal ideological weaklings with periodic security checks. The latter are seen to be potential long-term security threats. New immigrants from USSR and East European countries are normally denied access to classified information for a minimum of four to five years.

All personnel requiring clearance must complete a personal history statement and undergo tourine investigation. For higher clearances this may involve the whole family and full field investigation.

50. Have there ever been any embarrasing internal traitors ?

Yes, as was shown by the exposure of high-level spies in government and political parties in the late 1950s and early 1960s. It once was the case that former members of European Communist parties, "some of whom were eminently qualified for clandestine service, especially if they had renounced their Communist ideology and affiliated with the Israeli Labor Party" were considered suitable recruits. This did not apply after the scandals.

Figure 1- Soviet Agent Israel Beer

Both the following spied for the USSR: Aharon Cohen. A MAPAM party expert on the Middle East, and Israel Beer. A Defense Ministry contract employee and IDF Reserve lieutenant colonel. And for the Czech service: Dr Kurt Sitte. A Gentile professor of physics at Haifa Technion.

51. Are there any major security weaknesses ?

The 'Old Boy' network : Much like the British, the Israelis have an 'old-boy' network and will discuss classified subjects whether there is any 'need to know'.

Common religious ties : Overseas Jewry's support is needed but security is questionable because of possitiblity of divided loyalty.

Proteksia : This makes it difficult to follow the custom of excluding USSR and East-European immigrants from access to classified information.

52. What is the normal security breach prevention ?

"Within the IDF security risks are reported to Shin Beth and are closely supervised by the unit security officer, who is required to make periodic reports on the individual's activities. To stimulate and evaluate the security consciousness of the IDF cadre, Field Security personnel circulate among the troops and attempt to elicit military information."

53. Is it easy to recruit young Israelis to the Intelligence Service ?

(d) MORALE AND DISCIPLINARY METHODS

Mossad and Shin Beth are part of the Israel civil service structure and applicants have to pass a civil service examination. The preferred candidate is in their twenties and holds a university degree, unless has a particularly desirable alternative qualification. Recruitment for the services competes with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the growing business community. "Most young Israelis do not like the anonymity of the secret service and prefer the more remunerative pay scales of the business world." Those personnel who cannot cope with the circumscribed life limited by security restrictions and operational considerations are dropped. If they jeopardise the state they are severely punished. In the early 1960s the service asked for and got a 30% annual bonus from the Knesset to compensate for the risks and necessary anonymity.